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ABSTRACT 
  China has experienced one of the most remarkable increase in inequality over the last 
decade: the Gini coefficient increasing from 25.7 in 1984 to 37.8 in 1992. Using the recent 
developments in the theory of income distribution (Benerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and 
Zeira, 1993) and a new panel data set about Chinese provincial-urban-level income inequality, 
this paper finds that inequality increased with the reduction of the share of state-owned 
enterprises in GDP, high inflation, growth, and (less significantly) the increasing exposure to 
foreign trade. We also find some evidence for the Director’s Law: income redistribution tends to 
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shift resources from the rich and the poor to the middle class. We do not find schooling and 




  Among  many developed countries, Atkinson (1997) has noticed the unparalleled rise in 
United Kingdom income inequality in the 1980s:  
    “In the United States, the Gini coefficient of inequality for household income rose 
between 1968 and 1992 by three and a half percentage points.... This is a significant increase, but 
if you want to see a big increase then it is to the United Kingdom that one has to look. Between 
1977 and 1991, the United Kingdom Gini coefficient rose by 10 percentage points.”    
  Among developing countries, China shows a similar trend in rising income inequality. 
Starting from a relatively low Gini coefficient of household income of  25.7 on a scale of 100 in 
1984, China reached a relatively high Gini coefficient of income of 37.8 in 1992. Over a short 
period of 8 years, the Gini coefficient in China increased 12 percentage points, and the rising 
trend has been continuing to the present.  To illustrate the significance and uniqueness of the 
Chinese case, note that the Gini coefficient in India remained almost constant for forty years 
(1951-92) with a mean of 32.6 and a standard deviation of 2.0 (see Li, Squire and Zou, 1998, for 
more details on the evidence of intertemporal stability in the Gini coefficients for over forty 
countries).  
  The Chinese case is even more interesting when we consider its spectacular output 
growth since the economic reforms initiated in 1978. Over a period of 16 years (1978-1994), the 
average growth rate in terms of real GDP was 9.86 percent. This positive correlation between CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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income growth and inequality immediately throws doubt on the significant negative association 
between income growth and inequality found in Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) based on both theory and a cross section of international data. This positive 
correlation between growth and inequality also contradicts an influential World Bank study The 
East Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993), which found economic growth to be associated with 
low and declining levels of inequality for the eight East Asian countries excluding mainland 
China. On the other hand, this positive correlation seems to support the age-old Kuznets (1955) 
inverted U-curve and the more complicated theoretical relationship between economic growth 
and income inequality in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Banerjee and Newman (1993), 
Galor and Zeira (1993), Perotti (1993), and Benabou (1996), among many others (see Benabou, 
1996, or Atkinson, 1997, for a survey and further developments). 
  What accounts for the rapid rise in income inequality in China? Recent advances in 
income distribution theory mentioned above provides plenty of channels. While many of these 
theoretical models have confronted cross-country data, very few examine individual countries. In 
this paper, we follow Banerjee and Newman  (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), and Atkinson 
(1997), and apply their theoretical insights to the case of China. Since 1978 China’s experience 
provides a fertile field for testing the determinants of changes in income inequality explored in 
many recent theoretical contributions. We broaden the Benerjee-Newman and Galor-Zeira 
framework, and look at the role played by output growth, increasing exposure to international 
trade, urbanization,  taxation and government spending,  inflation, human capital formation, 
geography, and especially the sectoral structure of the economy (the share of state enterprises) in 
determining the changes of income inequality. Theoretical considerations of all these factors will 
be presented in section II. CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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  Section III provides a brief description of our provincial panel data on urban income 
distribution and all explanatory variables in our empirical study. We provide detailed regression 
analysis on the determinants of income inequality in Chinese provinces in sections  IV and V. In 
section VI, we summarize our findings and offer concluding remarks on the direction for further 
work. 
      
II. Some Analytical Considerations 
II.1  The Occupational Choice between the State Sector and Private Sector 
  In China and other transition economies the obvious choice facing individuals is whether 
to continue to work in the state sector or find new employment and set up a  money-making 
business in the private sector. Since the reform starting in 1978, the share of state-owned 
industrial output has continued to decline. The reduction is most dramatic in coastal provinces 
like Hainan and Guangdong, where state-owned enterprise (SOE) share of industrial output had 
declined as much as 30 to 40 percentage points. To model this choice and its effect on income 
distribution, we follow the ideas in Banerjee and Newman (1991, 1993), and Galor and Zeira 
(1993).  In general, the state sector continues to provide a stable and meager income plus various 
fringe benefits including free or cheap health care, schooling, and housing. These benefits are 
denoted ws. All agents live for two periods as in Galor and Zeira (1993). In the first period, they 
can either work in the state sector or invest in the private sector. All agents in our model 
maximize their life-time earning. If agents work in the state sector, they earn ws for both periods. 
During the first period, since they do not consume, their savings generate a capital income at a 
safe rate r. Therefore, their life-time income,  ys is  
yr x w w ss s    () ( ) 1 ,                                  (1)              CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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where x is the initial endowment for agents. As in Banerjee and Newman (1993), we assume that 
all agents are risk neutral. The risk-neutral assumption allows us to exclude the role of risk 
aversion in risk-taking and occupational choices.  Therefore agents in the state sector maximize 
their expected life-time income or expected second-period consumption: 
MaxEU y E y ss () ()  = yr x w w ss s     () ( ) 1 ,       (2) 
where E is the expectation operator. 
  For agents undertaking investment in the private sector, the investment project is 
indivisible and requires an initial investment of  I  units of capital
2. Here we can take  I  to be a 
combination of investment in both physical and human capital. If the project succeeds, it 
generates a random return I  where   is  h  or  l with probabilities q and 1-q, respectively, 
with  h  >  l > 0. Since all agents are assumed to be risk neutral, the agents in the private sector 
maximize their life-time expected income yp: 
EU E y x I r I q q ph l       ()( ) ( )[ ( )] ( ) 11 3               
if the initial endowment x is larger than I: x > I.   
  As in Banerjee-Newman and Galor-Zeira models, the credit market is assumed to be 
imperfect. In fact, in China only the powerful and the well-connected agents have access to 
credit markets at reasonable borrowing costs. If agents intend to invest in the private sector by 
credit financing, the cost is given by: 
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,                  (4)  
where b denotes the amount borrowed, R( > r ) is the official borrowing rate, which is never 
available to the public,   is the power index, and   is a positive parameter reflecting convex 
borrowing costs. For the initial poor with no political power or connections, they have no access 
to the credit market at the official rate R. Actual lending rates in the credit markets depend on the 
official rate, the power index and a rising marginal cost of borrowing. Those agents choosing to 
borrow will maximize their expected income: 




      (5) 
The optimal choice of b is a function of the official lending rate  R,  the power or connection 
index  , the deposit rate r, and the rising-cost parameter  : 
bb R r  (,,,)   .                                   (6) 
  Agents with an initial endowment x larger than I  or initially rich agents choose not to 
work in the state sector if and only if  
[( ) ( ) ]( ) qq r I w r hl s        1 1 2  .                 (7) 
In inequality (7), the left-hand side is the expected excess return on the indivisible investment in 
the private sector, and the right-hand side is the life-time earning in the state sector. Therefore, if 
(7) holds, initially rich agents with investment in the private sector  will become even richer in 
the second period compared to the employees in the state sector. In a province with a larger 
private sector, income distribution is likely to be more unequal compared to a province with a 
large share of state ownership. CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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  In this paper, we will call agents with power and connection, and access to credit finance 
as “powerful”. The powerful will invest in the private sector instead of working in the state 
sector if and only if  
Iq q r bR r r hbR r w r hl s [ ( ) ( )] ( , , , )( ) ( ( , , , )) ( )             11 1 2     (8) 
The left-hand side is the net gain from investment through borrowing in the credit market, and 
again the right-hand side is the life-time earning in the state sector. Therefore, agents even with 
poor initial resources but politically powerful are likely to become the new rich in the second 
period if credit costs are not exceedingly high. Agents with an initial endowment x smaller than I 
and without access to credit or cannot afford the credit will continue to work in the state sector. 
All things given, these poor agents in both economic and political terms will likely remain poor 
in the second period because they are excluded from the credit markets. The driving force for 
this result is the indivisibility of investment projects, as in Banerjee and Newman (1993) and 
Galor and Zeira (1993). 
  The model thus yields a few implications. The initial rich in the urban sector will become 
richer through their investment in the private sector; the initial poor will remain poor as the 
employees of the state sector if they lack political clout and access to credit markets; and the 
powerful, even without sufficient initial resources, may gain as a result of their access to credit 
and profitable, money-making opportunities. 
   
II.2 The Role of Other Factors in Determining Income Inequality 
  Our simple model allows us to consider the effects of various other factors on income 
distribution. First, aggregate growth can influence both the state sector and the private sector. An 
increase in the demand for the products manufactured in the state sector can lead to a higher CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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wage ws in equation (1) for the employees in the state sector, which may improve income 
distribution ceteris paribus. Meanwhile, the rising aggregate demand for products in the non-
state sector can lead to a higher probability of success in the private investment project q  or a 
higher average return on the private investment. With rising expected profits from investment as 
a result of the rise in market demand, the powerful can afford to borrow more and improve their 
economic lot in life. Thus the initial rich and the powerful may benefit from the increase in 
market demand disproportionally than the initial poor. If this is the case, income distribution can 
become even more unequal. For our empirical analysis, we take provincial GDP growth as an 
approximation for the aggregate change in market demand. 
  Second, foreign trade and foreign direct investment have played a special role in both the 
product market and the credit market in China. During the reform period, the government has 
granted export subsidies and foreign exchange retention to various special economic zones and 
open cities in different regions in order to promote exports. Their effects on wages and 
profitability can be favorable to both the state sector and the non-state sector. Trade licenses and 
quotas seem to benefit the rich and the powerful much more than the poor. The powerful have a 
direct access to trade licenses and quotas, and the rich can obtain these trade privileges through 
bribery and numerous other measures. Foreign direct investment and joint ventures can create or 
reduce the imperfection of the credit or capital market in China. The powerful and the rich are in 
a better position to collude with foreign investors in granting licenses for foreign direct 
investment and joint ventures. In this way, the powerful and the rich can benefit 
disproportionally from the rents generated by foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the 
flow of foreign capital into China naturally reduces the high borrowing cost in the credit market, 
and that may increase the possibility even for the poor to set up private businesses as a result of CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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lower borrowing cost parameters R  and   in equations (4) and (5).  Therefore, the net effect of 
foreign trade and foreign direct investment on income distribution is not clear. 
  Third, geographical location is relevant for income distribution across provinces. Coastal 
provinces like Guangdong and Fujian have a natural advantage in serving domestic and foreign 
demand through the sea ports and expanding their product markets to Hong Kong, Taiwan, the 
Pacific Rim, and Northern America. This partly explains why foreign direct investment and joint 
ventures have concentrated in coastal provinces in China. Since this concentration can 
significantly improve the access to the credit market not only for the rich and the powerful, but 
also for the poor in coastal provinces, geographical advantage may reduce income inequality in 
coastal provinces relative to inland provinces. 
  Fourth, large increases in the share of urban population are observed across provinces 
since 1978. Our model shed light on the effect on urban income distribution of urbanization and 
migration from the rural sector to the urban sector. If migrants have accumulated a certain 
amount initial capital through their individual efforts  or through the contributions from their 
rural communities or extended families, and if these funds are sufficient for them to set up 
private businesses in the urban sector, their migration to cities and towns can increase the 
number of the middle class or they may even become the new rich. That may even improve 
urban income distribution. But if migrants are very poor peasants and go to cities and towns to 
find employment opportunities, they may earn a lower wage in the informal sector than 
employees in the state sector. As a result, they become the new poor of the urban sector, and 
urban income distribution can become more unequal. Thus it is not clear how urbanization 
affects urban inequality. CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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  Fifth, the importance of income policy in the distribution of personal income has been 
emphasized by Atkinson (1997). If taxation and public spending intend to remedy income 
inequality, the government can tax investment income in the private sector and subsidize the 
workers and the poor in the state sector. Accordingly, income distribution is expected to improve. 
But if  tax revenues are channeled to subsidize credit for the politically powerful, income for the 
powerful may rise and income inequality may even increase. Furthermore, government spending 
may worsen income distribution if redistribution and public spending are tilted toward the 
middle class, the rich, and the powerful instead of the poor in education, health, and social 
welfare. Thus the net effects of income policy on inequality is ambiguous.  
  Sixth, inflation can affect the poor more than the rich and the powerful. In reality, the 
assets of the rich and the powerful are more diversified (stocks, equities, land ownership, private 
housing, and business ventures), whereas the urban poor and the state-sector employees depend 
mainly on salary and pension income, which are usually fixed at a nominal term and adjusted 
only slowly to the inflation rate. Thus, we expect that inflation raises income inequality and 
reduces the income share of the  poor. 
  
III.  Data and the Changes of Income Distribution in China, 1985-95 
  Current descriptive studies on inequality in China have mainly relied on per capita 
income and per capita consumption comparisons across provinces because systemic data on 
regional income distribution is lacking. Many studies report alarming, ever-growing disparities 
across provinces in terms of per capita income and consumption (Lyons 1991; Tsui 1991, 1996).  
Yet there is no provincial-level data on income inequality.  We try to fill this gap by employing 
the published results of average incomes of different percentiles for urban residents in each CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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province (World Bank, 1996). This new data set allows us to examine more closely how the poor 
are doing in each province, how the incomes of the poor and the rich income are determined, and 
how the income of the poor and economic growth are linked.   
  It is useful to get to know the data before proceeding to examine the income distribution 
of Chinese provinces. Based on the urban household surveys, the data we use covers the period 
of 1985 to 1995 (except 1987 and 1988) on the income distribution of urban residents of each 
province. For the 1989-95 period, there are 20 average incomes for each 5 percentiles (5 
percentile, 10 percentile, and so on). For 1985 and 1986 the data are less perfect: we have the 
average incomes of the bottom 10 percentile, the next 10 percentile, the next three quintiles, then 
the top two 10 percentiles.
3 Based on these data we computed the Gini coefficients, the 
percentage of income of top quintile in total income (Q5), that of bottom quintile (Q1), and that 
of the third and fourth quintiles (Q34), and the ratio of the percentage of Q5 over that of Q1 
(Q5/Q1).  
  While the computation of the rest of the measures is straightforward, the computation of 
the Gini coefficient is more complex. To compute this measure we used an approximation 
method, which has the virtue of being simple and without imposing parametric assumptions 
about the Lorenz curve.  In general, however, it underestimates the Gini with the assumption of a 
relative smooth Lorenz curve, and the downward bias decreases with the number of percentile 
points. When twenty 5-percentiles are used, for instance, the upper bound of underestimation of 
the Gini is 0.025. When 7 percentiles (as in 1985 and 1986) are used, however, the 
underestimation bias should be larger. In all our future regressions we correct for this problem by 
including a dummy variable whose value is 1 for the years of 1985 and 1986. This dummy 
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variable should capture the underestimation of the Gini, and other systematic biases for quintiles 
in 1985 and 1986. Since we cannot determine exactly the size of the bias here our descriptive 
discussion of income distribution shall focus on the 1989 to 1995 period. In later regressions we 
include 1985 and 1986 dummies to filter out the bias. 
  Since 1978 urban residents in most provinces have witnessed a worsening income 
distribution. Between 1989 and 1995 the Gini coefficient increased by 2.4 points (from 21.0 to 
23.4). The ratio of Q5 over Q1 rose from 2.0 to 2.6. Underlying these figures is an increasing 
disparity between the rich and the poor: Q5’s claim to total income went up from 27 percent to 
31.7 percent, and Q1’s share dropped from 14.6 percent to 12.5 percent. The middle class (Q34) 
also slightly suffered with the lapse of time: its share dropped by almost 1 percent from 41. 
  Worsening income distribution was by no means evenly shared among the provinces 
(table 1). Some provinces, such as Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Qinghai, did not change much; 
Xinjiang, located in the northwest corner of China, even improved its Gini by 1.3 point. Other 
provinces, in contrast, dramatically raised their Gini: Tianjin (one of the three municipalities) 
increased its Gini by more than 9.3 points, (inland) Henan by 9.5, (inland) Heilongjiang by 9.2, 
and (inland) Sichuan by 9 points. To summarize the changes in income distribution by provinces, 
table 2 presents the trend of the Gini coefficient by province. We found that 19 of the 29 
provinces had a positive and statistically significant trend. No province experienced a negative 
and significant trend in the Gini. More strikingly, Q5 increased significantly in 27 provinces, and 
Q1 decreased significantly in 24 provinces. The share of the middle class, Q34, dropped 
significantly in 7 provinces, and increased significantly in 3 provinces. Thus the more 
fundamental trend behind the worsening of the Gini is the increasing claim of wealth by the rich 
and the opposite for the poor in almost all provinces. CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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  While the income distribution worsened, the total pie for the Chinese grew. The average 
per capita GDP growth rate was 8.8 percent (table 3). The provinces exhibited a large difference 
in their growth. While the average growth rate was 4.8 percent for (inland) Qinghai, 5 percent 
for (inland) Heilongjiang, 6.3 percent for (inland) Guizhou, it was 14.2 for (coastal) Guangdong, 
13.9 for (coastal) Zhejiang, 12.7 for (coastal) Fujian, and 11.7 for (coastal) Jiangsu. The 
coefficient of variation for growth rate was also non-trivial: from 0.09 to 0.19. The correlation 
between the growth rate and the Gini coefficient is 0.27.  
  Accompanying the growth, the share of the volume of import and export to GDP 
increased dramatically. The highest trade shares, not surprisingly, were seen in Beijing, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Shanghai, and Tianjin, which are located near the seashore. The largest change in 
trade share over time also belonged to these trade giants. The dwarfs of trade were mostly inland 
provinces (the smallest being Guizhou, which saw a moderate increase in trade; Henan, which 
also had the second worst increase in trade share; Qinghai, which also had quite slow growth in 
trade share). The correlation between trade share and the Gini coefficient is 0.22. 
  Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for the variables we shall use. Note a high positive 
correlation between the Gini and inflation rate. The correlation between the Gini and schooling 
(as measured by the percentage of population having above secondary schooling) is -0.02, small 
in magnitude. Government expenditure (as measured by the share of budgetary expenditure of 
total GDP) also had negligible correlation with the Gini.  In addition, note the strong correlation 
of GDP growth with both the trade share and urbanization growth, and its negative correlation 
with the SOE share and that province’s distance to the coast by railroad. 
 
IV.  The Empirical Specifications and Issues CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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  Based on discussions in section II, our examination of income inequality involves these 
variables: (a) the occupational structure, specifically, the share of state-owned enterprises 
(SOES); (b) macro economic policies, in particular, as an implicit transfer (from the poor to the 
rich), the inflation rate (INFL), and as an explicit transfer, the share of government budgetary 
expenditure as a share of GDP (GEXPS); (c) geography as measured by the distance of a 
province’s capital to the nearest port by railroad (DISTA); (d) the share of residents with more 
than secondary schooling (SCH); (e) GDP growth rates; (f) the involvement of the provinces in 
foreign trade, as measured by the ratio of the value of the volume of import and export to GDP 
(TRADE), and finally, (g) the change of urbanization level of a province, as measured by the 
growth rate of the share of non-agricultural population in the province (URBANGR).
4  
  Note that the variables we use are province-level (not just the urban sector) measures. 
Ideally one wants to use the urban measures, but unfortunately it is not feasible given the data we 
have and all the sources we have checked. On the other hand, some variables have less problems. 
SOE, for instance, does not present a major problem because all SOEs are located in the urban 
domain. In addition, INFL in urban areas should be quite closely related to provincial inflation 
rates. Lastly, URBANGR is the ideal measure, because we want to see how urbanization growth 
itself affected the income distribution within the urban sector. This said, now we estimate the 
following equation
5: 
                                                 
 
4.  We chose not to use the growth of urban population because urban population, by official statistics, 
consisted of both true urban residents and farmers. Urbanization should therefore be measured as the share of non-
agricultural population. 
 
5 .  This specification is very close to Edwards (1997) and Li, Squire and Zou (1998) for cross-country 
study on the determinants of income inequality. The SOE share and geographic location are the added, special 
features for China. CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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   (9)   
where yit could be GINI, Q5/Q1, Q5, Q1, and Q34. We wish to examine how the explanatory 
variables affected the inequality (GINI, Q5/Q1), the rich (Q5), the poor (Q1), and the middle 
class (Q34). i  is unobserved province-specific factors that may affect yit. The inclusion of i 
is justified by the finding that inequality tends to persist over time (Li, Squire and Zou 1997). 
Wheni is correlated with the included explanatory variables (Xit), the fixed effects (FE) (or the 
least square dummy variables, LSDV) model is appropriate. When i is not correlated with Xit,  
a random effects model is more efficient than a FE model. We can test the correlation by the 
Hausman-Wu test, whose basic idea is that, if i is correlated with Xit, then FE estimates should 
differ significantly from RE estimates; consequently, if the difference of the two vectors of 
estimates is large, FE is preferred. In order to see whether the results are robust--since the theory 
does not tell us what conditioning information set is appropriate for the effects of variables of 
interests (Levine and Renelt 1992)--we experimented with many different sets of regressors. In 
particular, we consider SOES, INFL, DISTA, SCH, and GDPGR as the base set of regressors 
about whose impacts on outcomes we are most concerned. Then we add accumulatively one 
variables at a time, and all results are reported. 
  While FE estimates should filter out the time-invariant province-specific factors, we still 
have to consider the potential correlation of some elements of Xit with  it . Among Xit we 
consider DISTA, INFL, and SCH exogenous: (a) DISTA is a purely natural endowment; (b) 
SCH measures the percentage of population with more than secondary schooling, surveyed once 
every five years. This stock of human capital was largely a consequence of past history, unlikely 
to be correlated with it . (c) INFL is seen as exogenous because the monetary policy was set by CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
  16
the central banks, and unlikely to be correlated with the province-specific time-variant  it . It is 
still possible that it  follows an AR(1) process, and that it1affected INFLit; however, we have 
experimented with allowing  it  to be distributed as AR(1), and the results remained largely 
similar to FE estimates. Since our main concern is the correlation of endogenous variables 
with it -- and we control for provincial dummies--the lagged value of the endogenous variables 
should be considered predetermined, likely to be uncorrelated with it , and therefore, qualify as 
instruments. In addition, the share of rural industrial output in total rural output is strongly 
correlated with GDPGR and TRADE; yet it should not affect it , which measures the 




  Table 5 to table 9 report the empirical results. For each measure of income distribution 
(GINI, Q5/Q1, Q5, Q1, and Q34), we run OLS, FE, RE, and FE+2SLS model (in which we 
control for provincial dummies and also use the aforementioned instruments for two-staged least 
square estimation). The OLS results are not reported because all tests show them to be 
statistically inferior. In addition, we have experimented with a FE model (by controlling 
provincial dummies) with the AR(1) error term. The results are very similar to FE estimates; thus, 
we do not bother the reader with more numbers. 
 
The Gini Coefficient (Table 5) 
For model (1) and model (2) the Hausman-Wu test favors FE and for models (3) and (4) it favors 
the RE model. The R
2 reported for FE and RE models are R
2 within, computed using FE model CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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formulae--it measures the extent the deviation of the Gini from its provincial mean can be 
explained by by using the explanatory variables. The R
2 between (measuring the ability of the 
model to explain the difference between provincial means) tended to be very small, suggesting 
that our FE estimates fails to explain the level of the Gini coefficient. Yet, the R
2’s within are 
quite high, all above 0.69. Thus the changes of the provincial Gini’s can largely be explained by 
our measures.  
  The results for SOES, INFL, and SCH are robust. Provinces with higher SOE share had 
smaller Gini coefficients. The estimates suggest that an increase of a standard deviation of SOES 
would be associated with an increase of the Gini by 1.2 to 2.8. Provinces with higher inflation 
rates had higher Gini’s: a standard deviation of INFL was associated with an increase of the Gini 
by 0.7 to 1.0. The finding supports our earlier discussion. By the preferred FE or 2SLS models, a 
higher education probably increased the Gini. Before rushing into any judgment, note that SCH 
did not show large variations across time in our data set, and that it was fixed in every five years; 
so, for the purpose of accounting for the change of income inequality, SCH is not capable of 
contributing much. In fact, when we look into a similar measure of the Gini, Q5/Q1, this result 
no longer holds. 
  Growth (GDPGR) increased the Gini and is quite significant in all specifications except 
in the 2SLS model that controls for provincial dummies; in the latter model the sign remains 
positive, but becomes insignificant and smaller when we do not control for URBANGR. When 
URBANGR is controlled for in model (4), however, GDPGR become marginally significant.
6 
Similarly, the share of foreign trade in GDP (TRADE)  was significant in FE and RE 
                                                 
6   This finding is consistent with the positive association between inequality and growth in a cross-country 
study by Edwards (1997). CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
  18
specifications for all models. The use of 2SLS does not alter its sign, but it becomes insignificant. 
Whereas government expenditure is supposed to reduce income inequality, the opposite is found: 
models (3) and (4) consistently suggest that it increased inequality;  a standard deviation increase 
of GEXPS was associated with an increase of the Gini by 0.9 point (RE) to 1.2 point (2SLS).  
Finally, increasing urbanization (URBANGR) might have reduced income inequality; the large 
standard errors for estimates, however, urge caution. 
  In examining Q5/Q1 (table 6), we find similar results compared to the case of the Gini. 
This is hardly surprising. After all, they are both good summary statistics of inequality. A 
comforting discovery, though, is that GDPGR remains quite significant in the models of 2SLS 
with FE. Later, we shall add more support for this finding by examining how GDPGR improved 
Q5 and reduced Q1. Another finding is that the coefficient of schooling no longer approaches 
significance; and when we use 2SLS, the sign reverses. Lastly, GEXPS now has larger standard 
deviations, although the qualitative results remain intact. 
 
Q5 (Table 7) 
From model (1) to model (4), FE specification won the statistical contests convincingly, as 
witnessed by the small P-values of the Hausman-Wu test. Moreover, the use of instruments in 
general does not fundamentally change any result. The R
2’s within for FE are not as high as in 
the case of the Gini.  
  The market from 1985 to 1995 certainly benefited the rich. Q5, for instance, increased 
significantly with INFL, whose increase of one standard deviation was associated with about 0.5 
point increase of Q5. Furthermore, Q5 moved shoulder to shoulder with GDPGR, whose 
increase by one standard deviation increased Q5 by 0.6 to 0.7 according to point estimates. CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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TRADE has ambiguous signs when we compare FE (and RE) with 2SLS and with provincial 
dummies. When we increase the conditioning information set from model (2) to model (4), it 
becomes increasingly less significant. The use of instruments made it flip signs, but the large 
standard error precludes any strong assertion here.  
  The restraining force for the increase of Q5 seems to come mainly from the state. First, a 
large SOES was associated with lower Q5, a finding consistent with our assumption in the model. 
Moreover, a standard deviation increase of GEXPS was associated with 0.8 point decrease of Q5.  
Unrelated to the state, the direction of the effects of URBANGR on Q5 is not clear: the large 
standard deviations for FE and 2SLS estimates warrants caution. 
  Provinces that are far away from the coast have a larger Q5; this is consistent with our 
conjecture that inland capital markets are more imperfect. Another finding is that, in FE models, 
SCH seems to raise Q5; yet once instruments are used, its sign flipped. This finding suggests that 
higher Q5 for provinces with higher SCH reflected probably just the positive correlation of SCH 
with the error term in FE estimation. 
 
Q1 (Table 8) 
FE specifications still dominate RE ones, except in model (3). But the inclusion of instruments 
seems to matter. The R
2 within are similar to Q1: whereas a bit less than half of the variance of 
the changes of Q1 can be explained by our variables, still more cannot be explained by our 
model. 
  The most noticeable finding is that the forces that increased Q5 also reduced Q1, thus the 
poor came out of this period as the loser. INFL certainly had reduced the income share of the 
poor. When INFL increased by one standard deviation, Q1 would decline by around 0.4 CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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percentage point.  GDPGR, another force that helped the rich, harmed the poor in terms of 
relative share of income. When GDPGR increased by one standard deviation, Q1 dropped by 0.4 
point (FE), and 2SLS implies an even larger figure, especially when the conditioning 
information set is larger. TRADE, while helped the rich, again hurt the poor. The sign flip with 
the use of instruments does not suggest a strong effects of TRADE on the poor. Finally, the poor 
farther from the seashore claimed a smaller share of total income, an observation consistent with 
the role of imperfect capital markets in reducing the poor’s income in inland areas. 
  The state did not help the poor. The reduction of SOES reduced Q1. One standard 
deviation decrease of SOES would at least reduce Q1 by a whopping 7 points, even by more than 
10 points when a larger conditioning information set is used. In addition, GEXPS did not 
significantly help the poor. The consistently negative signs with large standard errors may even 
suggest the opposite. Finally, URBANGR did not give a consistent message: it was insignificant 
in FE and RE estimation, and approached significance in 2SLS. 
 
 Q34 (Table 9) 
Although our variables are least useful in predicting the fortune of middle class, the within R
2 
are the largest when compared to Q1 and Q5. This is hardly surprising. Q34 hardly changed on 
average over the period (at least for 1989-95). For most models, the Hausman-Wu tests do not 
favor FE or RE consistently. Not a single variable significantly affected Q34 consistently. We 
have some weak evidence that GDPGR reduced Q34, but the standard errors of estimates are 
large. 
  
VI. Conclusion CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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Examining the experiences of 29 provinces over 11 years, we have focused on how the change 
of income distribution (and the income share of the rich, the poor, and the middle class) had been 
affected by the changing structure of economy (higher growth rates, increasing exposure to 
foreign trade), the role of the state (the reduction of SOE sector, and more decentralized fiscal 
expenditure), and increasing urbanization. We have found that inequality and Q5 increased with, 
and Q1 decreased with, the reduction of SOE share, higher inflation and growth rates, and (less 
significantly) the increasing extent of foreign trade. We have also found some evidence for 
Director’s Law (Stigler 1970): income redistribution tends to shift resources from the rich and 
the poor to the middle class, as witnessed by the positive sign on Q34, but generally negative 
signs of Q5 and Q1. Intriguingly, provinces farther from the coast had larger inequality, an 
observation probably reflecting the consequences of greater imperfection of capital market. 
Schooling and increasing urbanization did not play a significant role in the increasing income 
inequality during this period.   
  The findings of this paper answer some questions, but elicits more questions. Is it 
inevitable that growth and openness will increase income inequality? Will the poor necessarily 
be the loser of the growth gains? Under what circumstances do the above scenarios arise? If the 
scenario is true, what can governments do to reduce the suffering of the poor during growth and 
global economic integration processes? In addition, given the nature of this data, and the short 
time-span we have, some questions evade answer. What determines, for instance, the level 
differences across different provinces? Further research is needed to answer these questions. 
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Data Appendix 
  Our empirical estimations are based on annual data for 29 provinces. Data sources are all 
official publications in China. Although over 100 volumes of statistical publications are involved, 
major data sources include China Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical yearbooks for 
various years. Variables used for estimations are listed below with their data sources. Names of 
provincial areas included in our estimations are also listed. 
GDPGR = the real growth rate of provincial GDP, measured at constant price level. 
Source: For 1985-1995: China Statistical Yearbook (Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian) 
various issues. 
TRADE = the degree of openness of a provincial economy, measured by the share of 
total volume of foreign trade (exports and imports) in provincial income. 
Source: Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (Zhongguo 
Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Nianjian), various issues in 1984-1994/95. 
INFL = the inflation rate, measured by the overall social retail price index in each 
province.  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian), various issues.  
GEXPS = total provincial public spending over provincial GDP. 
Source: For provincial population and government spending: various volumes of 
provincial statistical yearbooks. 
URBANGR= the growth rate of the share of urban population of total provincial 
population: 
Source: Various volumes of provincial statistical yearbooks. 
SCH = share of population with more than secondary schooling in  each province. CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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Source: Various volumes of provincial statistical yearbooks. 
SOE = share of SOEs output in provincial GDP. 
Source: Various volumes of provincial statistical yearbooks. 
  
 
List of provincial areas: 
  Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia), Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, 
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Table 1.  Some Statistics of Used Variables: by Province for the Period of 1985 to 1995 
  Gini  The real growth rate of 
provincialGDP 
The inflation rate  % SOE output in provincial GDP
  Mean  N x(T)-x(0) N  C.V. Mean  N x(T)-x(0) N C.V. Mean N x(T)-x(0) N C.V. Mean N x(T)-x(0) N C.V.
Anhui 19.69  11  4.76  8  0.11 10.68 24 1.47 19 0.88 10.2 5 6.3 15 0.67 49.1 7 -32.84 7 0.31
Beijing  17.89 2  4.27 7 0.12 7.95 14 -0.68 17 0.67 12.46 28 -6 1 0.46 59.26 16 -17.31 20 0.14
Fujian  22.56 25  6.56 17  0.14 12.72 27 -4.61 9 0.59 10.4 8 3.8 8 0.75 38.41 4 -38.81 3 0.33
Gansu  20.3 13  5.7 12  0.13 8.47 16 -5.21 7 0.4 10.74 15 8 19 0.62 77.08 28 -21.44 15 0.09
Guandong 24.89  28 3.44  2  0.12 14.22 29 -9.61 3 0.37 10.01 4 -2 4 0.88 35.51 3 -34.56 6 0.33
Guanxi 19.96  12  3.47  3  0.11 10.43 23 1.72 20 0.57 11.61 25 5.2 13 0.77 62.95 18 -35.57 5 0.22
Guizou  21.45 18  8.65 22  0.14 6.27 3 4.49 24 0.44 10.44 9 9.5 23 0.65 75.3 25 -12.43 24 0.07
Hainan 27.89  29  n.a.  n.a.  0.17 10.26 22 n.a. n.a. 0.67 12.53 29 -1.5  5 0.77 65.93 19 -39.41 1 0.21
Hebei 18.12  3  6.33  16  0.17 9.14 17 2.04 22 0.62 9.67 3 8 19 0.77 46.22 6 -22.64 14 0.19
Heilongjiang  21.72 21  9.16 24  0.15 5 2 9.3 26 0.69 11.23 21 2.6 7 0.46 76.57 27 -13.12 23 0.07
Henan  22.16 23  9.45 26  0.19 9.15 18 4.53 25 0.63 8.66 1 10 24 0.87 49.58 8 -32.28 8 0.22
Hubei 18.57  7  5.69  10  0.16 7.72 11 -3.46 12 0.68 11.04 19 9.1 22 0.69 57.66 14 -29.4 9 0.17
Hunan 22.02  22  3.71  4  0.11 7.64 9 -4.35 10 0.48 11.43 23 4.4 10 0.7 57.04 13 -25.65 11 0.16
Jiangsu  19.02 10  6.86 18  0.17 11.74 26 -10.5 2 0.75 10.94 17 5.1 12 0.66 29.85 2 -19.31 17 0.24
Jiangxi  20.64 14  5.69 11  0.14 9.43 20 -3.53 11 0.51 10.46 10 7.6 18 0.76 58.45 15 -17.76 18 0.18
Jilin  21.38 17  6.03 15  0.18 6.3 4 3.68 23 0.96 10.39 7 4.5 11 0.54 67.73 21 -9.85 27 0.06
Liaoning 18.89  9  7.04  19  0.15 7.23 8 -6.13 6 0.66 10.59 12 4 9 0.6 56.28 12 -23.74 13 0.15
Inner  22.23 24  5.72 13  0.12 7.89 12 -2.22 14 0.45 10.24 6 8.3 20 0.59 73.45 22 -15.3 21 0.08CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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Mongolia 
Ningxia 21.59  19  3.93  5  0.2 7.93 13 -0.86 16 0.61 10.67 14 7.5 17 0.56 76 26 -10.64 25 0.05
Qinghai 21.19  16  4.09  6  0.09 4.82 1 n.a.  n.a. 0.72 11.52 24 5.6 14 0.56 82.51 30 4.44 29 0.03
Shaanxi 21.72  20  n.a.  n.a.  0.17 6.92 7 -12.57 1 0.66 11.34 22 10.5 27 0.69 66.43 20 -14.45 22 0.08
Shandong 18.5  5  5.91  14  0.14 11.51 25 1.84 21 0.6 9.56 2 7.1 16 0.67 39.87 5 -23.86 12 0.32
Shanghai 17.31  1  8.26  21  0.19 8.39 15 -2.85 13 0.59 12.42 27 -3.4 2 0.4 60.08 17 -37.98 4 0.23
Shanxi 23.15  26  n.a.  n.a.  0.16 6.73 6 11.28 27 0.69 10.51 11 8 19 0.67 55.24 10 -17.44 19 0.13
Sichuan  20.92 15  8.95 23  0.18 9.31 19 -4.89 8 0.64 10.62 13 10.2 26 0.74 56.11 11 -29.29 10 0.21
Tianjin  18.82 8  9.33  25 0.18 6.63 5 0.56 18 0.7 10.76 16 -3.3 3 0.4 53.05 9 -39.04 2 0.26
Xinjiang 23.45  27  -1.28  1  0.12 9.59 21 -7.48 5 0.42 11.86 26 8.6 21 0.57 78.76 29 -10.32 26 0.04
Yunnan  18.52 6  5.49 9 0.13 7.69 10 -1.63 15 0.41 10.98 18 10.1 25 0.64 74.61 23 -8.5 28 0.04
Zhejiang 18.44  4  7.93  20  0.16 13.89 28 -8.31 4 0.61 11.21 20 -0.5 6 0.63 25.53 1 -21.43 16 0.29CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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             Table 1.  Some Statistics of Used Variables: by Province for the Period of 1985 to 1995  (Continue) 
 SCH  TRADE  GEXPS  URBANGR   
 mean  rank  x(T)-x(0)  rank C.V. mean rank x(T)-x(0) rank C.V. mean rank C.V.  mean rank x(T)-x(0) rank cv
Anhui 30.14  8  9.74  19  0.13 6.68 6 4.3 6 0.28 9.99 5  0.24  0.48 12 -0.63 6 0.8
Beijing  64.57 30  10.17 21  0.09 62.73 29 210.47 30 1.49 11.88 13 0.18  0.77 25 0.01 23 0.84
Fujian 26.00  5  7.4  10  0.11 39.41 27 38.45 25 0.46 13.64 17 0.22  0.48 11 -0.21 17 1.57
Gansu  28.12 6  6.95 5 0.12 5.88 4 6.64 14 0.46 18.87 24 0.09  0.41 6 -0.12 18 0.9
Guandong  34.52 13  10.27 22  0.12 83.03 30 132.27 29 0.7 10.62 9 0.1 0.89 29 -0.95 4 0.78
Guanxi 30.18  9  8.41  14  0.14 12.96 18 7.49 18 0.34 15.4 20 0.2 0.49 14 -0.03 20 0.86
Guizou  19.98 3  7.39 9 0.12 4.79 1 7.17 17 0.49 18.55 23 0.12  0.39 4 0.06 24 1.64
Hainan 40.28  22  n.a.  n.a.  0.01 34.09 25 48.32 27 0.69 15.04 19 0.26  0.75 24 -0.47 8 0.92
Hebei 38.44  18  7.03  6  0.12 11.31 17 0.88 2 0.28 10.48 8 0.23  0.34 3 0.17 28 1.04
Heilong  45.54 25  9.59 17  0.1 10.92 16 5.34 10 0.35 13.25 16 0.18  0.64 22 -0.03 21 0.82
Henan  39.63 20  10.37 23  0.15 5.51 2 3.24 3 0.28 10.39 6 0.17  0.47 10 -0.24 16 0.72
Hubei 37.23  17  6.08  1  0.11 8.85 12 6.72 16 0.3 10.47 7 0.17  0.68 23 -1.87 1 1.16
Hunan  35.05 14  8.5 15  0.13 8.12 11 3.29 4 0.37 11.27 10 0.11  0.48 13 -0.32 14 1.03
Jiangsu  41.17 23  9.41 16  0.09 16.12 19 17.97 23 0.4 7.18 1 0.13  1 30 -0.07 19 1.09
Jiangxi 29.92  7  9.69  18  0.18 7.71 8 4.61 7 0.27 12.7 14 0.16  0.6 20 -0.29 15 1.55
Jilin  46.50 26  12.04 28  0.12 16.5 20 10.87 20 0.39 17.23 21 0.2 0.78 26 -0.65 5 0.93
Liaoning 48.62  27  6.4  2  0.07 30.68 23 6.68 15 0.18 11.8 12 0.15  0.55 16 -0.53 7 1.05
Neimeng  39.97 21  7.69 11  0.07 9.21 14 6.15 13 0.4 21 25 0.21  0.56 18 -0.41 10 0.86
Ningxia  33.72 11  11.89 27  0.16 8.07 9 5.22 9 0.26 24.92 27 0.29  0.58 19 -0.37 13 0.69CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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Qinghai 25.76  4  11.27  26  0.19 5.86 3 4.71 8 0.35 25.13 28 0.18  0.63 21 -1.23 2 1.79
Shaanxi 39.34  19  7.32  8  0.1 9.12 13 11.5 22 0.52 n.a. n.a.  n.a.  0.52 15 -0.39 11 1.22
Shandong  35.53 15  10.77 24  0.1 16.5 21 8.54 19 0.22 8.12 2 0.18  0.8 27 -0.39 12 0.9
Shanghai  61.36 29  9.84 20  0.06 51.99 28 49.69 28 0.33 9.84 4 0.13  0.83 28 0.15 27 0.81
Shanxi  43.47 24  11.09 25  0.11 7.08 7 5.94 12 0.26 13.99 18 0.19  0.55 17 0.13 26 1.12
Sichuan  30.77 10  8.14 13  0.13 6.5 5 5.58 11 0.37 11.62 11 0.15  0.4 5 -0.43 9 1.09
Tianjin  52.63 28  7.88 12  0.06 38.92 26 47.89 26 0.45 13.09 15 0.21  0.45 8 0.26 29 1.49
Xinjiang 33.97  12  6.75  4  0.08 9.40 15 3.94 5 0.18 18.49 22 0.33  0.41 7 0.00 22 1.35
Yunnan  19.73 2  6.68 3 0.13 8.08 10 11.09 21 0.48 24.79 26 0.12  0.46 9 0.06 25 1.39
Zhejiang 36.64  16  7.31  7  0.1 17.77 22 19.18 24 0.42 8.53 3 0.18  0.32 2 -1.03 3 1.64
Note.  Source of data: various volumes of provincial statistical yearbooks. CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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  Table 2.  Trend of Inequality Measures over Time (1985-95) 
 










year Mean S.D.  Mean  S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
85 17.13  2.58 2.45 0.39 30.05 1.76 12.39 0.98 35.17 0.98 
86 16.43  2.11 2.38 0.36 29.57 1.21 12.59 1.06 35.54 0.55 
89 21.02  3.80 1.99 0.86 27.08 2.25 14.59 2.55 40.96 1.33 
90 20.25  2.60 1.84 0.27 27.01 1.94 14.85 1.25 40.74 0.98 
91 19.93  2.12 1.89 0.30 27.71 1.94 14.91 1.58 40.42 1.02 
92 20.81  2.57 2.10 0.33 28.80 2.02 13.89 1.32 40.55 0.80 
93 22.69  2.90 2.41 0.42 30.73 2.30 13.02 1.82 40.30 1.19 
94 24.63  2.88 2.75 0.55 32.05 2.69 11.93 1.53 40.63 1.20 
95 23.42  2.57 2.60 0.50 31.73 2.62 12.46 1.46 40.14 1.30 
Note.  These income inequality measures are based on the authors’ calculation based on the published accounts of the 
average incomes of urban residents for various percentiles. No data are provided for 1987 and 1988 because we do 
not have sources for these two years. 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Used Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.   
Dev. 
Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Min Max 
GINI 252  20.73  3.69  12.98 34.17 INFL 261 10.84 6.72  -4.40  26.8
Q1 247  13.41  1.90  5.05 19.49 SCH 259 36.62 12.10  1.53
a 68.21
Q5 247  29.41  2.77  21.4 40.36 DISTA  261 0.79 0.77 0.00 3.65
Q5/Q1 247  2.27  0.56  1.10 5.94 TRADE 261 19.10 28.17  1.63  232.70
Q34 247  39.41  2.40  32.25 45.57 GEXPS 224 14.22 5.77  5.65  35.77CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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GDPGR 259  8.83  5.76  -5.72 26.16 URBAN
GR 
261 0.58 0.64 -0.60  3.50
SOES 261  58.78  17.46  14.06 87.82    
a.  This low figure is attributed to Tibet. These income inequality measures are based on the authors’ calculation 
based on the published accounts of the average incomes of urban residents for various percentiles. 
 
 
Table 4. The Correlation Matrix of Used Variables 
 GINI  Q1  Q5  Q5/Q1 Q34 GDPGR SOES INFL SCH  DISTA  TRADE GEXPS
GINI  1                  
Q1  -0.43  1                 
Q5  0.58  -0.81  1                
Q5/Q1 0.57
 a -0.94  0.84  1                 
Q34 0.46  0.18 -0.25  -0.15  1               
GDPGR 0.27  -0.36  0.43  0.36  -0.06 1            
SOES -0.18  0.14 -0.15  -0.12  -0.31 -0.43  1.00         
INFL 0.40  -0.23  0.31  0.30  0.19 0.25  -0.27 1      
SCH -0.00  0.22 -0.23  -.10  0.35 -0.07  -0.21 0.11 1      
DISTA 0.17  -0.04  0.05  0.08  -0.06 -0.14 0.54 -0.01 -0.37  1     
TRADE 0.22  -0.05  0.10  0.08  0.17 0.28 -0.36 0.15 0.40  -0.35  1.00   
GEXPS -0.03  0.03 -0.06  0.02  -0.29 -0.30 0.75 -0.22 -0.42  0.50  -0.26 1.00 
URBANG
R 
0.15 -0.19  0.28  0.21  -0.05 0.39 -0.20 0.31 0.11 -0.14 0.12 -0.17 
Note.  See the data appendix for definition of varables. 
a.  This correlation is low because we pooled 1985-86 with the data in 1989-95. Recall that we had different number of 
observations for these two periods, and because of that, GINI is underestimated more in the first period than the second. Not 
surprisingly, this correlation becomes 0.82 when we only used 1989-95, and it turns to 0.98 when we use only 1985-86. 
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Table 5.  Determinants of the Gini coefficients  (Dependent Variable=Gini Coefficient) 
 
   Model (1) Model  (2) Model  (3) Model  (4) 
Model FE








No.  Obs.  251 251 250 247 247 246 239 239 238 239 239 238
R
2    0.696 0.687 0.799 0.701 0.690 0.800 0.704 0.695 0.803 0.704 0.696 0.690
Constant  21.328 23.066 28.501 18.344 21.229 26.064 17.328 19.839 25.725 17.461 19.819 11.950
 (6.080)  (12.115)  (4.710) (5.035) (11.241) (3.950) (4.705) (9.977) (3.929) (4.728) (9.833) (1.332)
SOES  -0.115 -0.078 -0.153 -0.091 -0.052 -0.136 -0.094 -0.069 -0.152 -0.095 -0.070 -0.132
  (-6.115) (-4.577) (-5.337) (-4.207) (-2.867) (-3.753) (-4.368) (-3.642) (-4.131) (-4.391) (-3.689) (-2.818)
INFL  0.106 0.123 0.094 0.121 0.136 0.104 0.127 0.142 0.108 0.130 0.144 0.162
  (5.178) (5.943) (4.192) (5.712) (6.599) (4.036) (5.707) (6.712) (4.006) (5.725) (6.658) (3.764)
DISTA   1.534  1.695  1.484 1.496
   (2.725)  (3.155)  (2.696) (2.671)
SCH 0.131  -0.002  0.176 0.149 -0.025 0.198 0.143 -0.011 0.159 0.140 -0.009 0.483
 (1.608)  (-0.068)  (0.969) (1.829) (-0.733) (1.094) (1.762) (-0.305) (0.869) (1.724) (-0.247) (2.081)
GDPGR  0.053 0.069 0.010 0.037 0.050 0.002 0.050 0.066 0.037 0.055 0.070 0.154
  (2.281) (2.846) (0.207) (1.563) (2.042) (0.041) (1.993) (2.602) (0.703) (2.097) (2.648) (1.389)
TRADE     0.050 0.060 0.029 0.049 0.056 0.020 0.049 0.056 0.053CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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     (2.640) (3.730) (0.844) (2.619)  (3.513) (0.598) (2.599) (3.485) (1.337)
GEXPS     0.096  0.135 0.158 0.097 0.136 0.111
     (1.792)  (2.703) (2.109) (1.813) (2.707) (1.217)
URBANGR       -0.136 -0.126 -2.149
       (-0.661) (-0.595) (-1.682)
   




2 6 () 
24.60 
  
2 7 ()   
42.52 

2 8 ()   
28.86 
   P:  0.000  P: 0.000   P: 0.000  P:   0.000 
Note.  In the parentheses are the t-statistics.  See the data appendix for the definitions of the variables. 
a.  In all these tables, the R
2 reported for FE and RE specifications are R
2 within. This is appropriate because we focus on the change of the dependent variables. 
b.  The Hausman’s (Chi-Square) test statistics: a large value favors the FE model (instead of RE model); P is the associated P-value.  CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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Table 6.  Determinants of Q5/Q1  (Dependent Variable=Q5/Q1) 
 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 FE RE  2SLS
LSDV




No.  Obs.  246 246 245 242 242 241 234 234 233 234 234 233
R
2  within  0.412 0.388 0.548 0.416 0.393 0.535 0.412 0.394 0.519 0.412 0.395 0.108
Constant  2.040 2.332 4.758 1.677 2.154 4.933 1.565 2.012 4.835 1.570 2.016 0.588
  (2.569) (7.833) (3.454) (2.003) (7.130) (3.189) (1.842) (6.226) (3.084) (1.842) (6.130) (0.234)
SOES  -0.021 -0.010 -0.023 -0.018 -0.008 -0.024 -0.019 -0.011 -0.027 -0.019 -0.011 -0.021
  (-5.024) (-3.193) (-3.497) (-3.726) (-2.366) (-2.879) (-3.784) (-2.908) (-3.108) (-3.778) (-2.940) (-1.703)
INFL  0.019 0.023 0.014 0.020 0.024 0.013 0.020 0.024 0.013 0.021 0.024 0.029
  (4.000) (5.141) (2.670) (4.200) (5.351) (2.182) (3.998) (5.156) (2.046) (3.947) (4.982) (2.539)
DISTA   0.160  0.181  0.163 0.167
   (1.949)  (2.214)  (1.939) (1.940)
SCH  0.025 -0.003 -0.026 0.028 -0.005 -0.027 0.027 -0.002 -0.034 0.026 -0.002 0.059
  (1.376) (-0.527) (-0.623) (1.482) (-0.934) (-0.644) (1.425) (-0.425) (-0.792) (1.415) (-0.400) (0.961)
GDPGR  0.017 0.021 0.026 0.016 0.019 0.026 0.018 0.021 0.034 0.018 0.021 0.071
  (3.230) (3.748) (2.269) (2.845) (3.285) (2.203) (3.061) (3.575) (2.629) (2.943) (3.365) (2.258)
TRADE     0.006 0.006 -0.002 0.006 0.005 -0.004 0.006 0.005 0.006CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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     (1.375) (1.998) (-0.258) (1.294)  (1.685) (-0.493) (1.287) (1.683) (0.587)
GEXPS     0.013  0.018 0.031 0.013 0.018 0.021
     (1.022)  (1.690) (1.705) (1.027) (1.685) (0.890)
URBANGR       -0.008 0.003 -0.641
       (-0.159) (0.057) (-1.778)
   
2 5 () :  
20.31 

2 6 () :
18.88
  
2 7 () :
17.63

2 6 () :
16.84
    P: 0.001  P: 0.004   P: 0.014 P: 0.032
Note.  In the parentheses are the t-statistics.  See the data appendix for the definitions of the variables. 
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Table 7.  Determinants of Q5  (Dependent Variable=Q5) 
 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 FE RE  2SLS
LSDV




No.  Obs.  246 246 245 242 242 241 234 234 233 234 234 233
R
2  within  0.530 0.508 0.618 0.538 0.515 0.596 0.548 0.519 0.626 0.550 0.523 0.442
Constant  27.492 30.552 45.699 25.785 29.489 48.047 27.436 30.054 47.971 27.301 30.158 33.600
 (8.295)  (19.437)  (7.275) (7.416) (18.336) (6.729) (7.896) (17.521) (6.995) (7.856) (17.367) (3.400)
SOES  -0.110 -0.068 -0.091 -0.095 -0.054 -0.101 -0.089 -0.049 -0.093 -0.088 -0.049 -0.071
  (-6.224) (-4.443) (-3.040) (-4.644) (-3.326) (-2.589) (-4.390) (-2.788) (-2.422) (-4.326) (-2.813) (-1.483)
INFL  0.087 0.105 0.061 0.096 0.112 0.055 0.077 0.102 0.039 0.073 0.096 0.093
  (4.490) (5.387) (2.600) (4.783) (5.709) (1.962) (3.678) (5.056) (1.379) (3.410) (4.656) (2.042)
DISTA   0.985  1.080  1.140 1.175
   (2.182)  (2.407)  (2.457) (2.495)
SCH  0.148 -0.016 -0.303 0.156 -0.026 -0.342 0.152 -0.030 -0.286 0.155 -0.031 0.032
  (1.923) (-0.552) (-1.608) (2.004) (-0.912) (-1.768) (1.997) (-1.003) (-1.522) (2.034) (-1.007) (0.132)
GDPGR  0.123 0.136 0.220 0.117 0.130 0.228 0.107 0.128 0.207 0.099 0.118 0.325
  (5.518) (5.857) (4.172) (5.080) (5.391) (4.139) (4.541) (5.182) (3.643) (3.954) (4.559) (2.632)
TRADE     0.031 0.032 -0.018 0.026 0.032 -0.021 0.026 0.032 0.014CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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     (1.736) (2.199) (-0.492) (1.453)  (2.141) (-0.583) (1.476) (2.136) (0.359)
GEXPS     -0.113  -0.048 -0.122 -0.116 -0.052 -0.156
     (-2.249)  (-1.009) (-1.542) (-2.310) (-1.098) (-1.668)
URBANGR       0.211 0.228 -2.105
       (1.087) (1.112) (-1.486)
   
2 5 () :  
32.06 

2 5 () :
31.87
  
2 5 () :
22.90

2 5 () :
21.81
    P: 0.000  P: 0.000   P: 0.002 P: 0.005
Note.  In the parentheses are the t-statistics.  See the data appendix for the definitions of the variables. 
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Table 8.  Determinants of Q1  (Dependent Variable=Q1) 
 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 FE RE  2SLS
LSDV




No.  Obs.  246 246 245 242 242 241 234 234 233 234 234 233
R
2  within  0.469 0.456 0.600 0.475 0.463 0.589 0.470 0.459 0.571 0.471 0.460 0.192
Constant 13.474  12.651  4.630 15.001 13.117 4.115 15.032 13.319 4.424 14.989 13.333 18.507
 (5.470)  (12.341)  (1.055) (5.804) (12.268) (0.833) (5.745) (11.697) (0.880) (5.713) (11.510) (2.275)
SOES  0.068 0.043 0.070 0.056 0.036 0.079 0.056 0.040 0.087 0.056 0.041 0.065
  (5.208) (4.027) (3.365) (3.674) (3.217) (2.919) (3.646) (3.248) (3.075) (3.659) (3.278) (1.648)
INFL  -0.053 -0.063 -0.031 -0.060 -0.067 -0.028 -0.059 -0.065 -0.027 -0.060 -0.066 -0.081
  (-3.650) (-4.494) (-1.916) (-4.021) (-4.698) (-1.457) (-3.720) (-4.483) (-1.322) (-3.734) (-4.413) (-2.160)
DISTA   -0.540  -0.614  -0.569 -0.576
   (-1.871)  (-2.085)  (-1.879) (-1.867)
SCH  -0.061 0.011 0.132 -0.071 0.018 0.124 -0.068 0.015 0.137 -0.067 0.014 -0.173
  (-1.071) (0.592) (1.003) (-1.232) (0.958) (0.924) (-1.182) (0.751) (0.995) (-1.163) (0.699) (-0.867)
GDPGR  -0.067 -0.074 -0.126 -0.059 -0.067 -0.127 -0.061 -0.069 -0.146 -0.064 -0.071 -0.267
  (-4.054) (-4.328) (-3.421) (-3.478) (-3.788) (-3.330) (-3.432) (-3.831) (-3.507) (-3.392) (-3.718) (-2.625)
TRADE     -0.024 -0.018 0.015 -0.022 -0.017 0.021 -0.022 -0.017 -0.012CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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     (-1.792) (-1.820) (0.598) (-1.658)  (-1.647) (0.811) (-1.645) (-1.653) (-0.372)
GEXPS     -0.013  -0.026 -0.075 -0.014 -0.027 -0.043
     (-0.338)  (-0.775) (-1.300) (-0.363) (-0.790) (-0.560)
URBANGR       0.068 0.043 2.113
       (0.461) (0.283) (1.812)
   
2 5 () :  
14.14 

2 6 () :  
14.36 
  
2 7 () :  
15.81 

2 8 () :  
14.90 
   P: 0.015  P: 0.026   P: 0.027  P: 0.061 
Note.  In the parentheses are the t-statistics.  See the data appendix for the definitions of the variables. 
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Table 9.  Determinants of Q34  (Dependent Variable=Q34) 
 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 FE RE  2SLS
LSDV




No.  Obs.  246 246 245 242 242 241 234 234 233 234 234 233
R
2  within  0.855 0.852 0.851 0.858 0.853 0.849 0.854 0.849 0.844 0.856 0.850 0.837
Constant  42.999 41.053 37.306 42.165 41.299 36.719 41.921 41.400 36.526 42.024 41.319 34.382
  (22.501) (66.907) (11.070) (21.094) (64.872) (9.717) (20.387) (59.703) (9.538) (20.476) (58.605) (7.442)
SOES  0.003 -0.012 -0.016 0.009 -0.014 -0.019 0.007 -0.012 -0.025 0.007 -0.012 -0.022
  (0.294) (-1.742) (-0.969) (0.741) (-1.995) (-0.912) (0.625) (-1.414) (-1.169) (0.548) (-1.388) (-0.974)
INFL  0.000 -0.007 -0.003 0.003 -0.008 -0.004 0.007 -0.007 -0.001 0.010 -0.004 0.008
  (0.025) (-0.652) (-0.273) (0.273) (-0.772) (-0.294) (0.552) (-0.665) (-0.040) (0.810) (-0.321) (0.358)
DISTA   -0.013  -0.032  -0.033 -0.046
   (-0.079)  (-0.189)  (-0.183) (-0.250)
SCH  -0.063 0.011 0.105 -0.055 0.012 0.131 -0.056 0.009 0.118 -0.059 0.010 0.165
  (-1.429) (1.083) (1.040) (-1.241) (1.073) (1.278) (-1.251) (0.773) (1.123) (-1.302) (0.840) (1.456)
GDPGR  -0.014 -0.022 -0.022 -0.020 -0.023 -0.024 -0.018 -0.026 -0.013 -0.012 -0.020 0.006
  (-1.058) (-1.774) (-0.762) (-1.476) (-1.793) (-0.824) (-1.321) (-1.925) (-0.410) (-0.800) (-1.410) (0.109)
TRADE     0.011 -0.005 -0.005 0.011  -0.005 -0.007 0.010 -0.004 -0.002CEMA Working Paper No. 473 
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     (1.041) (-0.815) (-0.256) (1.029)  (-0.665) (-0.351) (1.003) (-0.626) (-0.110)
GEXPS     0.022  -0.011 0.057 0.025 -0.009 0.053
     (0.742)  (-0.461) (1.301) (0.825) (-0.373) (1.206)
URBANGR       -0.163 -0.146 -0.330
       (-1.415) (-1.287) (-0.499)
   
2 5 () :  
13.74 

2 6 () :
11.83
  
2 7 () :
10.42

2 8 () :
11.69
    P: 0.017  P: 0.066   P: 0.166 P: 0.165
Note.  In the parentheses are the t-statistics.  See the data appendix for the definitions of the variables. 
 